Abstract:

In most countries, public schools in disadvantaged districts have relatively fewer experienced teachers than those in more privileged districts. As teacher experience is an important indicator of good education outcomes, this presents itself as an important shortcoming of public education. Moreover, many of such countries use centralized matching mechanisms for assigning new teachers to their first jobs at schools and reassigning tenured teachers who would like to move. We address the unfair teacher distribution problem through a market design approach by introducing two new centralized (re)assignment mechanisms. The defining property of these mechanisms is that the final allocation improves not only teachers' welfare with respect to the status quo but also makes the schools better off by creating a more even teacher distribution. While both mechanisms are strategy-proof for teachers, one achieves two sided Pareto efficiency and in particular teacher optimality and the other one achieves an appropriately defined stability property, targeted for countries that already use stability-based assignment schemes. We empirically estimate teacher preferences using data from the existing assignment system in France and test our proposals' performance using several empirical metrics.

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https://boun-edu-tr.zoom.us/j/99884068783?pwd=NDlUTFAyc0FLcUFoWElUdndScEE4UT09
Meeting ID: 998 8406 8783
Passcode: 084414

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January 15, 2021 - 16:00