Ahmet Altınok (Nazarbayev University) will give a seminar titled "Dynamic Many-to-One Matching".

Abstract:

We study many-to-one matching markets in a dynamic framework with the following features: Matching is irreversible, participants exogenously join the market over time, eachagent is restricted by a quota, and agents are perfectly patient. A form of strategic behaviorin such markets emerges: The side with many slots can manipulate the subsequent matching market in their favor via earlier matchings. In such a setting, a natural question arises:Can we analyze a dynamic many-to-one matching market as if it were a static market? After introducing a notion of dynamic group stability which is akin to the notion of sub-gameperfection, we first provide sufficient conditions under which the answer is yes. Second, weshow that if these conditions are not met, then the early matchings are "inferior" to the subsequent matchings; rationalizing empirical evidence on early-regular college admission in the US.Please click here to register.

The event will take place in both Natuk Birkan Building NB119 and Zoom.

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